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INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2002, the George W. Bush administration published the 
“National Strategy for Homeland Security,” which begins with an open letter 
from President Bush to the people of the United States. The letter introduced 
the American public to “Homeland Security,” a concept Bush repeatedly 
framed in relational terms—as a “national strategy, not a federal strategy,” as a 
“shared responsibility” across the various levels of American government, and 
as a function of “mutually supporting state, local and private-sector 
strategies.”1 
The Homeland Security strategy of cooperative security governance 
appeared to have broad political support when the Bush administration created 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and tasked the agency with 
orchestrating law enforcement collaboration across federal, state, and local 
government. Congress passed the federal legislation appropriating the funds 
for DHS by impressive margins: 299–121 in the US House of Representatives 
and 90–9 in the US Senate.2 Less than a year after DHS began operations, it 
incorporated the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a subsidiary, 
renaming the division the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency 
(ICE).3 ICE officials immediately initiated a cooperative immigration 
 
 1. Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, to Americans 
(July 16, 2002), in THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (July 2002), available 
at http://www.subjecting-freedom.org/pdf/National_Strategy_of_Homeland_Security_2002.pdf. 
This important briefing from President Bush established Homeland Security as an administrative 
framework based, in part, on norms of cooperation across the various levels of government. The 
following passage indicates the manner in which the Bush administration introduced the concept 
of Homeland Security to the nation. “On October 8, I established the Office of Homeland 
Security within the White House and, as its first responsibility, directed it to produce the first 
National Strategy for Homeland Security. . . . This is a national strategy, not a federal strategy. 
We must rally our entire society to overcome a new and very complex challenge. Homeland 
security is a shared responsibility. In addition to a national strategy, we need compatible, 
mutually supporting state, local, and private-sector strategies. Individual volunteers must 
channel their energy and commitment in support of the national and local strategies. My intent in 
publishing the National Strategy for Homeland Security is to help Americans achieve a shared 
cooperation in the area of homeland security for years to come. . . . We have produced a 
comprehensive strategy that is based on the principles of cooperation and partnership. As a result 
of this Strategy, firefighters will be better equipped to fight fires, police officers better armed to 
fight crime, businesses better able to protect their data and information systems, and scientists 
better able to fight Mother Nature’s deadliest diseases. We will not achieve these goals 
overnight . . . but we will achieve them” [emphasis added]. Id. 
 2. Donald P. Moynihan, Homeland Security and U.S. Public Management Policy Agenda, 
18 GOVERNANCE 171, 181 (2005). 
 3. Sen. Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law 
Enforcement in the Realm of Immigrant Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 325, 327 (2005). 
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enforcement program structured to stem the flow of unauthorized immigration 
and protect the nation from terrorism and other threats to domestic security.4 
Between 2001 and 2008, a number of subnational jurisdictions balked at 
the ICE proposal of cooperative immigration enforcement, choosing to abstain 
in part or in full from the federal government’s augmented immigration 
enforcement apparatus.5 After introducing the Secure Communities program in 
2008, ICE officials responded to state and local sanctuary policies by 
representing that subnational police participation was mandatory rather than 
elective.6 Unconvinced, state and local public officials pressed the issue and 
presented their alternative legal findings. Only then did ICE acknowledge that 
it could not “commandeer” state and local police into the revamped 
immigration enforcement program.7 
This brief narrative captures the second wave of “immigrant sanctuary”—a 
term used to describe the state and local government practice of restricting 
police departments from participation in immigration enforcement. The 
immigrant sanctuaries of the Homeland Security era are of unique significance 
given the ongoing dialogue among legal scholars regarding the significance of 
local law enforcement participation in national and domestic security 
administration after 2001, as well as the legal framework structuring 
cooperative security governance.8 
Despite the broad powers wielded by the federal government in security 
administration, the Supreme Court’s holding in Printz v. United States serves 
 
 4. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A 
Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 21 (2006). 
 5. Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1466 (2006). 
 6. Paloma Esquivel, Federal Immigration Enforcement is Mandatory, Memo Says, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/08/local/la-me-ice-foia-20120109. 
 7. See Julia Preston, Immigration Program Is Rejected By 3rd State, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2011, at A13; Letter from Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting Director of ICE, to Mike Thompson, U.S. 
House Representative (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjus 
tice.org/files/2014_02_25%20Thompson-signed-response-ICE.pdf. 
 8. See generally Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of 
Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1231 (2004); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: 
Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277 
(2004); Harris, supra note 4. The American public has also grown skeptical of the breadth of 
federal power in the field of security. Polls show that the daily revelations of secret government 
surveillance programs and the ever-expanding federal security infrastructure leave the polity 
questioning whether security governance is democratically accountable or instead operating as an 
autonomous system largely impervious to public opinion and conventional political power. 
Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on Skeptical Public, PEW RES. CTR., Jan. 20, 2014, 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/20/obamas-nsa-speech-has-little-impact-on-skeptical-pub 
lic/; see also Most Young Americans Say Snowden Has Served the Public Interest, PEW RES. 
CTR., Jan. 22, 2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/22/most-young-americans-
say-snowden-has-served-the-public-interest/. 
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as a substantial check against federal overreach.9 Hand wringing by legal 
scholars over the Court’s reasoning in Printz and the rigid rules against 
commandeering attached to this reasoning10 have obscured the fact that the 
case now stands as a bulwark against the expansion of federal authority over 
state, county, and local police. Given the holding in Printz, ICE cannot require 
the active participation of subnational police in immigration enforcement and 
must instead—despite its previous assertions to the contrary—solicit this 
support through state and local governments who may, in turn, participate in 
immigration enforcement of their own volition. 
How does an elective rather than legally mandated system of cooperative 
security governance impact domestic security? Opponents of the Court’s 
decision in Printz contend that the rule against federal commandeering of state 
and local police hamstrings the federal government in times of national 
emergency, compromising the security of the citizenry.11 Supporters argue in 
response that Printz would likely galvanize public debate about the very 
conception of domestic and national security, as it gives state and local 
governments clear legal authority to establish formal bureaucratic opposition to 
the federal ambition to expand security infrastructure through the incorporation 
of subnational police.12 
The case of immigrant sanctuary will not resolve the debate among the 
justices in Printz or among the legal scholars concerned with the impact of the 
decision on the contours of federalism in contemporary American society. It 
can, however, offer empirical evidence helpful in investigating a few of the 
primary, yet speculative, claims made by advocates on either side of the 
commandeering debate. In the empirical portion of this article, I present the 
case of immigrant sanctuary as a platform from which to consider the promise 
and peril of anti-commandeering jurisprudence in the Homeland Security era. 
My empirical analysis of immigrant sanctuary is based on an original dataset I 
created, made up of coded data from seventy-five immigrant sanctuary laws 
and policies and basic demographic information from the associated 
jurisdictions. 
I build a backdrop upon which to consider the data analysis in Part I, by 
explicating the anti-commandeering rule and outlining the legal debate over its 
costs, benefits, and constitutionality in the Homeland Security era. In Part II, I 
 
 9. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 10. See generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress 
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Kevin 
Todd Butler, Printz v. United States: Tenth Amendment Limitations on Federal Access to the 
Mechanisms of State Government, 49 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1998); Neil S. Siegel, 
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2006). 
 11. Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 12. See generally Althouse, supra note 8; Young, supra note 8. 
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provide an overview of the sanctuary policies enacted between 2001 and 2008, 
followed by data analysis that allows for an evaluation of some of the core 
claims made by opponents and proponents of the Printz decision. I complete 
the analytical portion of the paper in Part III by drawing the legal theory of 
expressive state action to the immigrant sanctuary case and the 
commandeering debate. The expressive theory of state action is especially 
salient in the context of bilateral security governance, where federal 
conceptions and theories of security tend to take shape unilaterally (i.e., by 
federal “say-so”) and outside of the public eye and public discourse. I conclude 
with a few thoughts about the importance of combative federalism to the fields 
of crime and security governance. 
I.  PRINTZ AND THE PROSPECT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
A. The Case Against Federal Commandeering in the Homeland Security Era 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Printz, established a bright-line 
rule prohibiting the federal “commandeering” of state and local police.13 The 
holding in Printz invalidated a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act that required Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs) at the 
state and local levels to provide temporary assistance to federal officials in the 
regulation of gun purchases.14 Citing the dual sovereignty principle of 
federalist governance and its holding in New York v. United States, the 
majority in Printz held that though the Constitution permits the federal 
government to require or prohibit specific acts by individuals, the federal 
government may not compel state governments to assist in the regulation of 
such acts.15 
The Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power 
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we 
may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient 
solution to the crisis of the day.16 
Given the scope of federal power in the field of security governance, the 
Court’s rationale in Printz deserves careful consideration in the Homeland 
Security era, where international and domestic threat gives the federal 
government great deference in shaping the public’s conception of the condition 
popularly known as “security” as well as the means by which to establish the 
condition.17 Federal power in the fields of crime and security governance now 
extends beyond the scope of federal security infrastructure to the level of 
 
 13. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925, 935. 
 14. Id. at 933–34. 
 15. Id. at 918–20. 
 16. Id. at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992)). 
 17. See generally PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND GOVERNMENT (2004). 
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subnational government, where law enforcement officials are increasingly 
subject to the national security agenda and related initiatives. In many 
instances, these initiatives conflict with the local crime control agenda and, in a 
more general sense, the local understanding of the “secure community.”18 The 
Court’s commitment to preserving a system of decentralized governance 
through the anti-commandeering rule might now seem prescient given the 
revelations of secret and expansive federal surveillance in the document leaks 
by the former federal contractor, Edward Snowden,19 and related public 
concerns about the extent to which federal security institutions remain 
accountable to the democratic process.20 
B. “State Sovereignty” as a Threat to Domestic Security 
Few, if any, critics of the anti-commandeering rule call for the Court to 
permit unrestrained federal commandeering of state and local police. Most 
contend, from a functionalist orientation, that the Court’s bright-line rule 
against commandeering is imprudent given the myriad of exigent 
circumstances in which the federal government may need to enlist local police 
in a law enforcement or security initiative.21 The common example within this 
line of argument is the complex terrorist attack that spans two or more 
jurisdictions. However, climate change and the need for intergovernmental 
coordination to protect against violent storms, flooding, and related mass 
displacement seem just as significant. Many of the problems arising from 
Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina were immediate and dire; they transcended 
jurisdictional boundaries and required cooperation across the federal, state, and 
local levels of government. Given these circumstances, what sense would it 
make to hamstring federal officials with a bright-line rule that bars federal 
commandeering of state and local police? 
In his dissent in Printz, Justice Stevens describes the value of centralized 
security administration in uncertain times.22 
 
 18. See generally Daniel M. Stewart, Collaboration Between Federal and Local Law 
Enforcement: An Examination of Texas Police Chiefs’ Perceptions, 14 POLICE Q. 407 (2011); 
David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635 (2005); Veena 
Dubal, The Demise of Community Policing? The Impact of Post-9/11 Federal Surveillance 
Programs on Local Law Enforcement, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 35 (2012). 
 19. Editorial, Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2014, http://www.ny 
times.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-blower.html?_r=0. 
 20. See Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on Skeptical Public, supra note 8. Despite 
its concerns about centralized authority, the Court has granted the federal government 
considerable deference in security matters. See generally Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the 
Courts, and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906–25 (1990). 
 21. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939–70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. 
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Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a 
military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an epidemic, or 
perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national response 
before federal personnel can be made available to respond.23 
Stevens determined the imposition on local law enforcement officers in the 
event of federal commandeering to be modest and the Court’s “absolute 
principle” barring the enlistment of local law enforcement to be a dangerous 
overreaction.24 Many in the legal academic community have expressed similar 
disapproval regarding the majority’s method of argument,25 its claims that the 
rule barring commandeering bolsters federalist values,26 and its general 
insensitivity to the value of commandeering in the case of national 
emergency.27 
The most concerning aspect of the national security objection may be the 
suggestion that the public could suffer grave harm in a time of crisis if the 
federal government is not allowed a free hand to coordinate intergovernmental 
collaboration.28 Fortunately, this claim can be evaluated empirically. In the 
following section, I use the case of immigrant sanctuary to investigate the 
specific claim made by supporters of the Printz decision regarding its impact 
on the federal government’s ability to secure cooperative arrangements across 
the various levels of government in the specific context of a national crisis. To 
my knowledge, there has not been a study that assesses subnational 
government utilization of the anti-commandeering rule in the context of 
security governance, despite much speculation regarding national vulnerability 
as a consequence of the rule and countervailing claims regarding the rule’s 
unique ability to temper federal government power. 
II.  IMMIGRANT SANCTUARY AS A TEST CASE 
A. Three Propositions Regarding the Relationship Between National 
Security, National Emergency, and the Rule Against Commandeering 
Scholars wary of the expansive growth of federal power in the era of 
Homeland Security and the War on Terror have identified the anti-
 
 23. Id. at 940. 
 24. Id. at 966–67, 977. 
 25. See generally Butler, supra note 10. See also Caminker, supra note 10. 
 26. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1630–57. 
 27. One commenter expressed his dismay that the anti-commandeering rule was “so broad, 
so insensitive” that it did not provide for leeway even when the federal government 
commandeered in order to satisfy a compelling government interest—”for example, 
commandeering of state and local officials in the wake of a terrorist attack or devastating 
hurricane.” Id. at 1655. 
 28. Id. at 1686 n.202 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
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commandeering rule as one of the few mechanisms moderating this power.29 In 
response to scholars and jurists who support situational commandeering—
particularly in the context of national emergency—commandeering opponents 
have held to the notion that the Court’s decision in Printz protects social 
interests easily forgotten in moments when warnings of threat to national 
security seem pervasive and unrelenting.30 Though the claims of 
commandeering opponents are not easily confirmed or dismissed, I look to test 
their validity using data from the immigrant sanctuary case. 
To this end, I have identified three key assertions made by commandeering 
opponents regarding the anti-commandeering rule and its ramifications for 
security governance. 
1. Commandeering opponents argue that in the Homeland Security era, 
the concepts of “national security” and “national emergency” are a 
point of contention.31 For instance, commandeering opponents have 
criticized Justice Stevens’s assertion in Printz that high murder rates in 
the United States constitute a national emergency that might require an 
intergovernmental response orchestrated by the federal government.32 
They argue that the cause of violent crime is best understood through 
an investigation of local milieu and, more fundamentally, that the 
“national security/emergency” labels should be subject to public 
debate.33 The anti-commandeering rule is thought to have the effect of 
decentralizing government power in the context of such a debate, 
undermining the hegemonic quality of various narratives pertaining to 
the nation’s security. In the absence of federal commandeering, state 
autonomy in crime and security governance would, in theory, reveal 
“national security” to be a variable social construction rather than an 
essential and knowable entity. 
2. Commandeering opponents also maintain that when states abstain from 
federal enforcement initiatives they are likely to engage and enrich a 
national debate about conceptions of emergency, threat, and national 
security. In addition to revealing dissent regarding the true meaning of 
security, state autonomy is thought to provide the discursive space for a 
dynamic and inclusive debate between state and local collectives and 
federal officials regarding “best practices” and best perspectives in the 
field of security governance. 
 
 29. See generally Althouse, supra note 8. 
 30. See id. at 1273. 
 31. Id. at 1272. 
 32. Id.; Printz, 521 U.S. at 940–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 33. See Althouse, supra note 8, at 1262. 
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3. Commandeering opponents argue that the anti-commandeering rule 
does not require an emergency exception given that subnational 
governments will feel immense pressure to cooperate with federal 
officials in circumstances that are appropriately classified as national 
emergencies34 or when the situation is “dire.”35 According to this view, 
the willingness of subnational jurisdictions to join the federal 
government in a domestic security or criminal enforcement initiative is 
itself a reliable test of the credibility of the federal government’s threat 
and security claims. 
The proliferation of immigrant sanctuary policies between 2001 and 2008 
provides an excellent empirical case from which to assess these propositions. 
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the 
department’s subsidiary, ICE, looked to establish an augmented immigration 
enforcement program using state and local police as surrogates.36 Select 
officers would receive the authority to make arrests for the violation of federal 
immigration laws and federal officials expected every police department, jail, 
and prison to identify the unauthorized immigrants that came into their 
custody.37 
The federal government developed the collaborative initiative through the 
287(g) provision of the IIRIRA of 199638 and the Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP), which was eventually succeeded by “Secure Communities,” or S-
Comm.39 Immigration enforcement partnership programs did not gain traction 
at the subnational level until 2006 when the American public began to express 
serious concern about the scale of unauthorized immigration.40 
  
 
 34. See Young, supra note 8, at 1291. 
 35. Althouse, supra note 8, at 1274. 
 36. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: 
A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf. See generally Adam B. Cox & 
Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87 (2013) (“Today, local police are 
being integrated into federal immigration enforcement on a scale never seen before in American 
History.”). 
 37. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 36, at 5; Cox & Miles, supra note 36, at 93. 
 38. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 § 133, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1357). 
 39. Cox & Miles, supra note 36, at 93. 
 40. See infra Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Sanctuary Policies and Enforcement Partnerships, Cumulative 
(2001–2008)41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instead of walking in step with the DHS program, many subnational 
jurisdictions obstructed the integration of the federal immigration system and 
state and local criminal justice systems. Some in this group publicized their 
stance, seemingly inviting a confrontation with the federal government.42 Each 
sanctuary jurisdiction either prohibited or restricted local police collaboration 
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, concluding that the ICE 
partnership initiative undermined one or several local interests such as local 
community solidarity and efficacy in local crime governance.43 
In May of 2003, the state of Alaska based its decision to restrict police 
participation in immigration enforcement on its objection to perceived federal 
infringement of civil liberties.44 The Alaska immigrant sanctuary provision is 
embedded within a broader range of restrictions preventing local police from 
aiding federal officials in the exercise of new powers and authorities granted 
by the Patriot Act.45 The city of Richmond, California, also objected to the 
federal immigration enforcement campaign, but for very different reasons.46 
 
 41. Data on file with the author. 
 42. Cecilia M. Vega, San Francisco Promotes Services for Illegal Immigrants, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-promotes-services-
for-illegal-immigrants-3219519.php; Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Reaches Out to Immigrants, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/us/06immig.html?pagewanted= 
print&_r=0; DreamActivist, San Fransisco–Sanctuary City, YOUTUBE (Apr. 4, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMzsUo2aM4U. 
 43. See Vega, supra note 42; see also McKinley, supra note 42. 
 44. H.R. J. Res. 22, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Richmond City Council, A Resolution of the Richmond City Council Reaffirming Its 
Support For Comprehensive Immigration Reform That Is Fair, Just and Humane, Res. 11–07 
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Richmond’s policy cited a shortage of agricultural labor and the dysfunction of 
the national immigration system as its primary rationales.47 
B. Data on Immigrant Sanctuary Policy 
Scholars have yet to systematically account for the rationales driving the 
immigrant sanctuary movement or the legal mechanisms facilitating immigrant 
sanctuary practice. I sought to fill this gap in the literature through an analysis 
of immigrant sanctuary policy actions taken by subnational governments 
between 2001 and 2008.48 I use the results of this analysis to assess the 
aforementioned claims regarding the value of the anti-commandeering rule in 
the context of security governance. 
The population of sanctuary policies underlying the analysis were coded 
for the time of enactment, the level of policy restriction, the state in which the 
policy was enacted, the region of the country in which the policy was enacted, 
the type of jurisdiction enacting the policy (i.e., city, county, or state), and the 
rationale(s) expressed in the preamble of the policy. A review of the full slate 
of immigrant sanctuary polices enacted between 2001 and 2008 revealed nine 
primary rationales expressed across the seventy-five policies. 
The immigrant sanctuary policies that populate the dataset derive from an 
original list published by the National Immigration Law Center in 2009, titled, 
 
(Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/archives/67/reso.%2011-07%20Immi 
gration%20Reform.pdf. 
 47. Id. 
 48. (n=75). The policy timeline ends in 2008 due to the federal government’s shift in 
immigration enforcement strategy. In 2008, federal officials launched the Secure Communities 
program, which relies on a reflexive data sharing process that occurs between subnational police 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cox & Miles, supra note 36, at 93; see also AARTI 
KOHLI ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY AT 
UC BERKLEY SCHOOL OF LAW, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1–3 (Oct. 2011). For several decades, the FBI has provided a 
courtesy criminal record-check service for state and local police, which all subnational police 
departments utilize in criminal processing. The Secure Communities program simply inserted an 
additional data-share mechanism in which every state and local police request to the FBI for a 
criminal records check triggers a simultaneous check of the ICE immigration database. If the ICE 
database check indicates that the detainee is an unauthorized immigrant or eligible for an 
immigration related sanction, ICE issues a detainer for the criminal suspect. Consequently, 
subnational enforcement partnering and immigrant sanctuary policy lost relevance after 2008 
when the federal government introduced Secure Communities as a national program that would 
trigger the immigration-status verification mechanism in response to any criminal records check 
requested by state or local police. See Laura Sullivan, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the 
Threat Posed to Sanctuary Law by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime 
Information Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 583–85 (2009); see also Cox & Miles, 
supra note 36, at 94–95. 
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“Laws, Resolutions, and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting the 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws by State and Local Authorities.”49 
C. Findings and Analysis 
The sanctuary policy dataset produced a series of findings that speak to the 
three claims by commandeering opponents who hold, generally, that the anti-
commandeering rule in Printz provides important social and political benefits 
in an era of centralized and opaque security governance. 
Claim 1: The anti-commandeering rule undermines the hegemonic quality of 
the domestic and national security narratives and concepts circulated by federal 
officials. 
The resurgence of the immigrant sanctuary movement after 2001 
demonstrates the rupture of the federal security narrative by way of 
counteractive measures by subnational governments.50 Abstaining jurisdictions 
spanned the political spectrum—from conservative and politically moderate 
states like Alaska, Montana, and New Mexico, to liberal enclaves like 
Berkeley, California, and Ann Arbor, Michigan. The sanctuary policy actions 
took the form of both legislative and administrative mechanisms,51 which 
suggests that a variety of state and local government institutions challenged the 
federal government’s cooperative enforcement initiative and the assertion of 
cooperative immigration enforcement as essential to domestic security. 
Table 1.1: Sanctuary Policy Actions, 2001-200852 
 
Policy Mechanism 
 
Total Percentage 
Ordinances 
 
9 12.0% 
Resolutions 
 
50 66.7% 
Police Orders 
 
12 16.0% 
Executive Orders 
 
4 5.3% 
Total Sanctuary Policy 
Actions 
75 100% 
 
 49. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (NILC), LAWS, RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES 
INSTITUTES ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING THE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE 
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2009). 
 50. See infra Figure 1.2. 
 51. See infra Table 1.1. 
 52. Data on file with the author. 
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Claim 2: The anti-commandeering rule functions as a platform for debate 
between the federal government and subnational governments regarding the 
precise meaning of domestic security. 
The challenge posed by sanctuary jurisdictions introduced alternative 
narratives regarding the relationship between unauthorized immigration and 
domestic security.53 These oppositional security narratives can be found in the 
preamble of the sanctuary policies themselves. In general, they contend that the 
associated population is less stable, cohesive, and ordered (specifically, less 
secure from physical, social, and economic harms and civil rights and civil 
liberties violations) when its police partner with the federal government to 
enforce federal immigration law. 
Figure 1.2: Sanctuary Policy Rationales by Year54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When placed along a timeline, these oppositional narratives roughly 
correspond to dominant security discourses at the federal level.55 For instance, 
in 2003, just after the passage of the Patriot Act and creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security, rationales related to the expansive federal power in the 
field of security were the rationales most frequently cited across sanctuary 
policies.56 Available evidence suggests that between 2001 and 2005, DHS 
promoted cooperative immigration enforcement as necessary for its 
counterterrorism strategy. However, in 2005, when federal officials pivoted to 
a security narrative that claimed unauthorized immigration as a societal threat 
in its own right (apart from its implications for counterterrorism), rationales 
related to the impact of police participation in immigration enforcement on 
police efficacy were the rationales most often expressed in sanctuary policy 
 
 53. See supra Figure 1.2. 
 54. Data on file with the author. 
 55. See supra Figure 1.2. 
 56. See infra Figure 1.3. 
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actions. For example, most of the policy actions taken between 2006 and 2008 
expressed concern that home raids by ICE damaged the relationship between 
police and local immigrant communities.57 Other sanctuary policy actions in 
the same time frame made the more general claim that police participation in 
ICE diminished the police department’s ability to investigate, solve, and 
prevent crimes. These correlations show attentiveness among state and local 
governments to the specific security claims of DHS, and a discursive response 
by dissenting jurisdictions, narrowly tailored to the federal security narrative of 
the hour.58 
Figure 1.3: Federal Overreach Rationales59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 57. See infra Figure 1.4. 
 58. Letter from Mary Elizabeth Heffernan, Secretary for Massachusetts Governor Deval 
Patrick, to Marc Rapp, Acting Director, Secure Communities (Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security) (June 3, 2011) (on file with author). 
Ethnographic and archival research could confirm and expand upon these findings. I did find 
anecdotal evidence from several sanctuary jurisdictions showing that state and local officials 
directly and often publicly challenged ICE’s claims regarding the threats associated with 
unauthorized immigration, the proportion of criminal aliens in the unauthorized immigrant 
population, and the credibility of the “criminal alien” classification. 
 59. Data on file with the author. 
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Figure 1.4: Police Efficacy Rationales60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data do a poor job of capturing nuance within the state and local 
government objections to cooperative immigration enforcement. A qualitative 
inquiry via case study, producing rich, fine-grained data regarding local 
sentiment and related public debate would convey in clearer terms the nature 
of the federal-subnational debate over enforcement and sanctuary. However, 
the temporal analysis of the oppositional narratives in the immigrant sanctuary 
policy preambles and the DHS immigration enforcement narratives show a 
discursive exchange regarding the notion and pursuit of domestic security after 
2001. This exchange reverberated in open letters between state and local 
government attorneys, Homeland Security officials, and United States 
Attorneys’ offices, and in the context of aggressive public advocacy from local 
and federal politicians and immigrant rights groups.61 The study underlying 
this article allows for a nation-level temporal analysis, but cannot account for 
the robust debates in each jurisdiction that likely preceded the enactment of 
any one immigrant sanctuary policy. 
 
 60. Data on file with the author. 
 61. Data on file with the author.; Jaxon Van Derberken, Feds Probe SF’s Minor Offender 
Shield, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 29, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Feds-
probe-S-F-s-migrant-offender-shield-3206605.php; Don Babwin, Cook County Defies 
Government on Immigration, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2011, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/ 
cook-county-defies-government-immigration. 
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Claim 3: Subnational governments that opt for a combative, rather than 
cooperative, stance in relation to a federal security initiative will make 
exceptions in the interest of public safety. 
Table 1.2: Level of Enforcement Restriction62 
 
Level of Restriction 
 
Number of 
jurisdictions 
 
% 
Level-1: Barring the use of government 
resources for the enforcement of 
immigration law (without clear 
exception) 
 
 
23 
 
30.6% 
Level-2: Barring the use of government 
resources for the enforcement of 
immigration law with specific 
exceptions.63 
 
 
31 
 
 
41.3% 
Level-3: Barring the use of government 
resources for immigration enforcement 
actions that target individuals solely 
based on immigration status 
 
 
16 
 
21.3% 
Level-4: Objection to local participation 
in immigration enforcement absent 
meaningful restrictions 
 
 
5 
 
6.7% 
Total 75 100% 
My preliminary analyses show that most of the jurisdictions enacting 
sanctuary policy between 2001 and 2008 included exceptions to the restrictions 
on police participation in immigration enforcement. Moreover, the specified 
restrictions fell along a continuum. To convey the variation in the degree to 
which sanctuary policies restrict local officials from participating in 
immigration enforcement, I classified sanctuary policies as belonging to one of 
four levels of restriction.64 Fewer than one-third of the seventy-five sanctuary 
policy actions do not include an exception. Thirty-one provide narrow 
 
 62. Data on file with the author. 
 63. Restriction exceptions have been coded as (a) serious crime (n=7), (b) criminal or traffic 
offenses (n=23), and (c) permission by designated city official (n=1). 
 64. See supra Table 1.2. 
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exceptions and twenty-one include broad exceptions. None of the policies 
established a sanction for breach of the noncooperation policy. 
State and local governments rarely place a total ban on cooperation in 
immigration enforcement. Though many subnational governments vigorously 
objected to the scope and intensity of the immigration enforcement campaign 
launched after 2001, the policies stemming from such objections, more often 
than not, included provisions that local officials believed would ensure public 
safety. Level 3 and 4 restrictions, though present in only 28% of the policies,65 
allow police considerable discretion in regard to the question of whether to 
refer an unauthorized immigrant detainee to ICE. 
The sanctuary policies articulated other exceptions common to state and 
local legislation. Many of the city and county sanctuary resolutions and 
ordinances instruct local officials to ignore sanctuary policy if required to do 
so by “state or federal statute, regulation, or court decision.”66 This provision 
acknowledges the ability of a state legislature to mandate cooperative 
immigration enforcement by local police via state statute if it considers 
enforcement cooperation essential to the preservation of security of state 
residents.67 Put simply, states generally have the option of overriding city and 
county sanctuary provisions. A functional immigrant sanctuary at the local 
level therefore requires both a local sanctuary law or policy and the absence of 
a preemptive state statute mandating local cooperation with federal officials. 
III.  SECURITY IDEOLOGY AND THE EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF STATE ACTION 
A. Immigrant Sanctuary as Functional Dysfunction 
Commandeering proponents offer two additional arguments against the 
Printz decision and a constitutionally assured fragmentation across American 
law enforcement and security institutions. First, why should state and local 
jurisdictions be permitted to obstruct federal immigration enforcement 
initiatives in pursuit of democratic accountability? Would it not be more 
effective to situate democratic accountability for domestic security policy at 
the federal level, exercised through the state and local representatives who 
serve in Congress? Given the diversity of threats facing the nation in the 
Homeland Security era, political consensus regarding security governance 
seems a clear prerequisite for strong security. If congressional representatives 
(rather than state and local representatives) collectively determined the scope 
and quality of domestic and national security initiatives, state and local police 
 
 65. See supra Table 1.2. 
 66. See, e.g., BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, REAFFIRMING BERKELEY AS A CITY 
OF REFUGE, No. 63, 711-N.S. (2007). 
 67. While states generally can force local governments to cooperate in enforcement, the 
federal government cannot. 
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departments could freely participate in federal directives. Americans would 
then, in theory, receive the benefit of both cohesive and democratically 
accountable security governance. This model of democratic accountability 
establishes a unified system free of the gaping holes in the nation’s security 
umbrella caused by state or local enforcement abstinence policies. 
What, then, makes the anti-commandeering rule and the opportunity it 
provides for enforcement dysfunction a superior legal framework for security 
governance? The social science literature on crime governance provides at 
least one compelling answer. It shows that democratic accountability in the 
field of crime governance runs along a continuum—it is strongest at the local 
level and weakest at the level of federal government.68 Ordinary citizens 
exercise meaningful influence over the quality of local policing and 
punishment, but this influence wanes at the state and federal levels where well-
organized and well-funded interest groups thrive. Congressional 
representatives are less responsive to citizen concerns than city council 
members, making the security initiatives organized at the federal level and 
dictated to local police departments an efficient and highly integrated model of 
security governance, but a model in which local communities surrender control 
of the local institutions built to serve them. 
The creep of federal influence over local crime governance over the past 
several decades only heightens concerns about federal commandeering in the 
Homeland Security era.69 Political scientists have argued in recent years that in 
contemporary American political life the citizens most affected by crime 
policy lack the basic resources necessary to lobby at the federal level. 
While some citizen groups seem to fare well on the national level, others—for 
example neighborhood associations, community-based organizations, ex-
offenders groups, mothers’ and parents’ groups—are deeply embedded in local 
contexts and often resource-poor, making it difficult to migrate across multiple 
legislative venues. . . . Policymakers at higher levels seem largely insulated 
from the policy priorities of these [resource-poor] groups, despite their 
persistent and occasionally successful organizing efforts at the local level.70 
The distribution of political power in the field of crime and security 
governance must be considered when contemplating a world without the anti-
commandeering rule. Federal influence over state and local police departments 
is likely negatively correlated with the influence of the moderately resourced 
political groups that aggressively advocate against penal excess or 
“overcriminalization” at the local government level. In the best of 
 
 68. See LISA MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM (2010); see also WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE 
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 
 69. See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 36; see also Cox & Miles, supra note 36 (regarding the 
technical innovations facilitating the Secure Communities program). 
 70. MILLER, supra note 68, at 6. 
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circumstances, the groups come to exercise meaningful influence over local 
crime policy. However, they find themselves at a severe disadvantage when 
decisions regarding the quality of local policing are made at the state and 
federal levels of government. 
The slate of immigrant sanctuary policies passed after 2001 and predicated 
on the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in Printz frustrated the 
efficient model of security governance that lies at the core of the Homeland 
Security model. They asserted local democratic control of the police and in 
many instances undermined the federal government’s national security 
narratives regarding criminal aliens. Evidence from the underlying study 
suggests that the incongruity between the federal government’s robust 
immigration enforcement initiative after 2001 and the immigrant sanctuary 
response fostered a dialogue in which immigrant sanctuary jurisdictions and 
allied advocates asked the American public to at least consider the notion of 
the unauthorized immigrant population as an essential part of the local 
community rather than a criminal threat to the same. In a remarkable 
transformation, the federal government, in response, has shifted from a plan 
that initially targeted the entire unauthorized immigrant population for 
deportation to a plan that targeted unauthorized immigrants in contact with the 
criminal justice system, and later to a plan that ostensibly targeted 
unauthorized immigrants charged with “serious crimes.” There are now 
indications that the federal government may abandon the cooperative 
immigration model entirely, which would all but sever the enforcement model 
of deportation via criminal detention.71 It seems fair to say that the immigrant 
sanctuary movement, though dysfunctional from the standpoint of efficient 
security governance, played a part in this process of immigration enforcement 
regression. Immigrant sanctuaries directly challenged the federal government’s 
theory of security and conceptualization of criminal threat. This is not a story 
of cooperation, efficiency, or synergistic management of a social problem, but 
instead one of resistance. In the case of immigrant sanctuary, enforcement 
resistance helped to transform American sensibilities in the field of security 
governance, despite a long history of intergovernmental consensus on such 
matters. 
B. Expressive Law and Social Meaning in Security Governance 
The final critique of my analysis of the anti-commandeering rule would 
likely call into question the impact of the immigrant sanctuary policies 
themselves and incorporated rationales. How are we to understand the 
 
 71. Letter from Jeh Johnson, DHS Secretary, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, 
Secure Communities (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland 
Security) (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 
1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf. 
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significance of these policies in terms of their role in contesting and shaping 
public perceptions of unauthorized immigrant presence? Fortunately, scholars 
have carefully considered this question in a rich literature on “expressive law.” 
This literature reveals the law’s expressive function and its power to transform 
social meaning,72 particularly in instances in which the federal government’s 
values and priorities conflict with those of subnational governments.73 
An inquiry into the expressive quality of law should begin with a few 
simple facts about the law itself. Some laws shape behavior by requiring 
sanction for undesired behavior, while others, though having an enforcement 
component, seek to shape social behavior primarily by “making statements” 
that shape social norms. In the latter case, law is crafted to govern human 
behavior by transforming social meaning rather than through coercion.74 
Expressive law may ultimately fail to have any impact on public opinion or it 
may fundamentally change social understandings. 
Given the apparent political consensus after 2001 that security governance 
must be cooperative across the various levels of government and the federal 
campaign to utilize local police resources in combatting unauthorized 
immigration, a normative shift that disentangled unauthorized immigrants from 
notions of criminal and security threat seemed highly unlikely. Yet this is 
exactly what happened over the course of the immigrant sanctuary campaign. 
A sizeable number of jurisdictions, including many large American cities, 
enacted immigrant sanctuary policy and in many instances articulated an 
alternative understanding of unauthorized immigrant presence—one that cast 
this recently maligned population as valued community members rather than as 
criminals. In his model of expressive law, Cass Sunstein captures the cultural 
thrust of the immigrant sanctuary policy movement. 
What is perhaps less standard is to see the law as an effort to produce adequate 
social norms. The law might either do the work of such norms, or instead be 
designed to work directly against existing norms and to push them in new 
directions. The latter idea is grounded on the view that law will have moral 
weight and thus convince people that existing norms are bad and deserve to be 
replaced by new ones.75 
If we are inclined to accept that the law has an expressive value and can 
transform social meaning, how can we determine when the expressive quality 
of law will find an audience or, alternatively, fall on deaf ears? The literature 
suggests that the law is more likely to have an expressive quality when it is 
 
 72. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 73. Adam Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering 
Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309 (2000). 
 74. Id. at 2024–25. 
 75. Id. at 2031. 
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local and well publicized. Americans tend to view local public law as an 
indication of public beliefs about a particular issue, far more so than state or 
federal public law. Scholars have argued that citizens lack full information 
regarding public opinion and that the government, in passing laws, provides 
one mechanism by which they come to understand local sentiment.76 
Consequently, pending bills and enacted legislation brought to the public’s 
attention have a greater likelihood of establishing the moral character of a 
given community. 
Immigrant sanctuary ultimately satisfies both of these criteria. Immigrant 
sanctuary policies are concentrated at the local level, in cities and counties that 
either oppose the use of police departments for federal rather than local 
priorities or object to the treatment of unauthorized immigrants by the federal 
government or in American society in general. The sanctuary policies have 
also received considerable media attention given that they directly conflict 
with a prominent federal security initiative and pertain to the contentious issue 
of unauthorized immigration. 
Expressive law holds unique value in the federalist system of governance, 
particularly in instances in which state or local governments pass laws 
challenging federal law or federal enforcement initiatives.77 Scholars have 
argued that in challenging the federal government by way of expressive law, 
state and local governments act as “alternative political institutions” rather than 
merely alternative or subservient systems of governance. As semi-autonomous 
political entities, subnational governments can reorient various national 
debates using the expressive quality of public law. The value of this tool is 
enhanced in fields like security governance, where the federal government 
tends to dictate the terms of related national debates. In the new cooperative 
paradigm of Homeland Security, the federal government seeks cooperative 
arrangements with state and local government, but arrangements facilitated by 
its own definition of domestic security and, likewise, its risk assessments of 
groups historically stigmatized in American society. Such assessments are 
often made in the aftermath of spectacular violence and in the midst of panic. 
Through expressive law, state and local governments can provide alternative 
security narratives and modes of security governance that penetrate national 
anxieties and force rigorous debate on the security matter in question. 
Expressive law thus provides special utility within the federal system of 
governance, where state and local governments have the power to challenge, 
disrupt, and even sink federal initiatives. I have attempted to argue, 
additionally, that this is especially true in the field of security, where federal 
cultural and administrative power reaches its apex. In the case of the immigrant 
 
 76. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 
358 (2000). 
 77. See Cox, supra note 73, at 1323–27. 
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sanctuary policy movement, state and local governments confronted the federal 
attempt to integrate the immigration and criminal enforcement systems. The 
federal government has incrementally retreated from the initiative and adopted 
a fresh narrative of immigrant presence in which the “criminal alien” label is 
no longer applied to unauthorized immigrants merely “in contact with” the 
criminal justice system, but more narrowly to unauthorized immigrants 
charged with serious offenses. This shift in enforcement indicates a change in 
the social meaning attached to unauthorized immigrant presence, setting the 
stage for more recent and ongoing modification of federal immigration 
enforcement priorities. 
CONCLUSION 
Absent the Court’s conclusion that the federal government “lacks the 
power to directly compel the States,”78 federal power in security governance, 
despite its recent heights, would increase substantially. Law enforcement 
resources at the subnational level greatly exceed those of the federal 
government. Data from 2004 identified 12,766 local police departments, 3,067 
county sheriff’s offices, 49 general service state law enforcement agencies, and 
1,481 specialty agencies in the areas of transit, park, and campus policing, 
among others. Federal security infrastructure is small in comparison, with the 
total number of federal law enforcement agencies falling somewhere between 
65 and 200 and the number of federal officers totaling around 105,000.79 The 
total number of Americans working as full-time law enforcement personnel at 
the subnational level stands at 1.1 million.80 
Given these statistics, it seems all but certain that the consolidation of state 
and local criminal justice resources for the purpose of federal ambitions in the 
field of domestic security would translate to a fundamental redistribution of 
government power. Among other things, it would likely establish a cultural and 
administrative continuum between crime governance and security governance, 
eliminating the distinction between criminal and national security matters that 
has largely preserved an accepted division of labor between the federal and 
subnational governments. 
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